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Resource	   Alloca/on	   Problems	   (RAPs)	   are	   concerned	   with	   the	  
op/mal	  alloca/on	  of	  resources	  to	  tasks.	  Problems	  in	  fields	  such	  as	  
search	   theory,	   sta/s/cs,	   finance,	   economics,	   logis/cs,	   sensor	   &	  
wireless	   networks	   fit	   this	   formula/on.	   In	   literature,	   several	  
centralized/synchronous	  algorithms	  have	  been	  proposed	   including	  
recently	   proposed	   auc/on	   algorithm,	   RAP	   Auc/on.	   Here	   we	  
present	   asynchronous	   implementa/on	   of	   RAP	   Auc/on	   for	  
distributed	  RAPs.	  































Async	  RAP	  Auc/on	  
Paradigm:	  	  
• Nodes	  are	  autonomous	  decision	  makers.	  	  
• Sources	  bid	  at	  arbitrary	  /mes	  based	  of	  outdated	  prices.	  
• Sinks	  accept	  bids,	  update	  and	  broadcast	  prices	  at	  arbitrary	  /mes.	  	  
• Outdated	  prices	  models	  memory	  or	  communica/on	  delays.	  















•  Total	  asynchronous	  algorithm:	  Autonomous	  agents	  collabora/ng.	  
•  Near	  op/mal	  solu/on	  in	  finite	  /me.	  
•  Works	  for	  any	  monotonic	  convex	  u/lity.	  Doesn’t	  presuppose	  a	  par/cular	  
cost	  func/on.	  







ASYNCHRONOUS	  AUCTION	  FOR	  DISTRIBUTED	  NONLINEAR	  RESOURCE	  ALLOCATION	  PROBLEM	  























• G = (W,T,E): bipartite graph
• W : Set of N sources
• T : Set of M sinks
• E: Edges
• si: Qty of res at ith src
• cij : Gain on arc (i, j)
• xij : Allocation from i to j
• Wj = {i : (i, j) ∈ E}
• Ti = {j : (i, j) ∈ E}






j∈Ti xij ≤ si ∀ i ∈W
zj =
￿
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" #si         $ i =1,…,N
     zj= 1Aj cij xij
i=1
N
"  $ j=1,…,M
     xij%0
Distribu-on	  of	  search	  effort	  
• Define ￿-CS for pair {x,p} as
pj ∈ [−f+j (zj),−f−j (zj)]
















• Theorem 1: If {x,p} satisfies ￿-CS & x is feasible,
then 0 ≤ (primal cost for x− dual cost for p) ≤ ￿s￿1.
• Theorem 2: # of iters is O(N3M2pmaxcmax/￿)




















































• pj ↓ bi
• yi is absorbed
• Assume j received bid
• Absorb as much of yi while
preserving ￿-CS till either:
• Θj : pj ￿→ zj
• Φj : zj ￿→ pj
Bidding	  Phase	  
• pj(t): price of sink j,
• zj(t): demand at sink j,
• gi(t): surplus at source i,
• U(t): set of all sources with +ve surplus,































If pj(t) ≥ bi + ￿/cij
• Accept as much of yi
preserving ￿-CS till either:
– pj(t) ↓ bi
– yi ↓ 0
• Intimate i if yi ￿= 0.
• Intimate srcs with flows reversed.
else discard & intimate i.
Source	  Update	  
If i receives flow message y
• gi(t+ 1) = gi(t) + y/cij .
• Theorem 3: Async Auction terminates in finite time to ￿-CS
satisfying {x∗,p∗} and feasible x∗ under following assumptions:
– U(t) ￿= ∅ ⇒ R(t￿) ￿= ∅ for some t￿ ≥ t.
– For all i, j, and t, limt→∞ τij(t) =∞.
• Pick source i with surplus > 0.
• Compute vij = cijpj .
(j1 best sink & j2 sec. best)
• Bid price: bi = (vij2 − ￿)/cij1 .
• Bid surplus: yi = cij1gi.
• Submit bid {yi, bi} to j1.
• Update old bid prices
if xik > 0, set bik = (vij1 − ￿)/cik.
If i ∈ R(t)
• Compute vij = cijpj(τij(t)).
(j1 best sink & j2 sec. best)
• Bid price: bi = (vij2 − ￿)/cij1 .
• Bid surplus: yi = cij1gi(t).
• Update: gi(t+ 1) = 0.
• Submit bid {yi, bi} to j1.
